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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

DALE KURT ROTHE,
Category:

Defendant-Appellant
vs.
JODY ROTHE,

Ccise N o .

880018-CA

Plaintiff-Respondent.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTION
The
this

Court

domestic

of

Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over

relations

matter

pursuant

to

Utah

Code

Annotated §78-2a-3(2)(g).
NATURE OF PROCEEDING
This is an appeal from a final ord^r on the Petition to
Modify Decree of Divorce entered
Court

on

the

17th

day

into

the

records

of the

of December, 1987. The Honorable

Judge George E. Ballif amended the Decree of Divorce entered
previously on

October 24, 1980 regarding health insurance,

visitation, child support, the
pay the

mortgage oh

obligation

the marital

of

plaintiff to

home^ and attorneys fees.

It is from the
of

the

Court's decision

mortgage

obligation

regarding the satisfaction

for which defendant-appellant

appeals.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL
I.

Did the tri(al court err in finding that the debt to

defendant-appellant's parents

did not constitute a legal or

equitable mortgage?
II.

Did the trial court err in

ruling that

there was

insufficient evidence to hold plaintiff-respondent liable on
the

debt

when

both

parties

acknowledged

the

debt, and

plaintiff-respondent had partially performed paying thereon?
III.

Was

the

trial court's finding that plaintiff-

respondent thought there was no other obligation on the home
besides

the

Veterans

Administration

mortgage against the

weight of evidence?
IV.
the term

Did the tibial court
"mortgage" was

respondent and

her

err in

failing to

find that

a diction error of both plaintiff-

attorney

pursuant

to

a

"no contest"

divorce in which defendant was unrepresented by counsel?
V.

Did the

mistake as to both

trial court

err in

parties' belief

defendant-appellant'is
reforming the decree

parents
of

that the

was

divorce

not finding a mutual

to

a

debt owing to

mortgage

reflect

and

thus

the parties'

intent that plaintifjf-respondent be responsible for the debt
2

regardless of the us,e of the term "mortgage" to describe the
debt?
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND
STATE STATUTES
Utah Code Annotated, §30-3-5(3):
The court has continuing jurisdiction to make
subsequent changes or new orders for the support
and maintenance of the parites, the custody of the
children and their support, maintenance, health,
and dental care, or the distribution of the
property as is reasonable and necessary.
Utah Code Annotated, §57-1-6:
Every conveyance of real estate, and every
instrument of ,writing setting forth an agreement
to convey any jreal estate or whereby any real
estate may be affected, to operate as notice to
third persons s(hall be proved or acknowledged and
certified in the manner prescribed by this title
and recorded in) the office of the recorder of the
county in which such real estate is situated, but
shall be valid and binding between the parties
thereto
without
such proofs, acknowledgment,
certification Jor record, and as to all other
persons who have had actual notice. Neither the
fact that
an1 instrument
recorded as herein
provided, recites only a nominal consideration,
nor the fact that the grantee in such instrument
is designated jas trustee, or that the conveyance
otherwise purports to be in trust without naming
the beneficiaries or stating the terms of the
trust, shall op'erate to charge any third person
with notice o,f the interest of any person or
persons not named in such instrument or of the
grantor or grantors; but the grantee may convey
the fee or sucfy lesser interest as was conveyed to
him by such Instrument free and clear of all
claims not dis,closed by the instrument or by an
instrument recjorded as herein provided setting
forth the name,s of the beneficiaries, specifying
the interest claimed and describing the property
charged with such interest.
3

Utah Code Annotated, §57-1-14:
(here
insert
name),
mortgagor,
of
(insert place of residence), hereby
mortgages to
(insert name), mortgagee,
of
(insert place of residence), for the sum
of
doll'ars, the following described tract
of landj in
County, Utah, to wit:
(here describe the premises).
This mortgage is given to secure the following
indebtedness (here
state amount and form of
indebtedness, maturity, rate of interest, by and
to whom payable and where).
The mortgagor
agrees to
pay all taxes and
assessments on said premises, and the sum of
dollars
attorneys1
fees in case of
foreclosure*
Witness the hand of
of
, 19 .

said mortgagor

this

day

Such mortgage as executed by law shall have the
effect of a conveyance of the
land therein
described,
together
with
all
the
rights,
privileges and appurtenances thereunto belonging,
to the mortgagee, his heirs, assigns and legal
representatives, as security for the payment of
the indebtedness thereon set forth, with covenants
from the mortgagor of general warranty of title,
and that all taxes and assessments levied and
assessed upon the land described, during the
continuance of the mortgage, will be paid previous
to the day appointed for the sale of such lands
for taxes; and| may be foreclosure as provided by
law upon any default being made in any of the
conditions thereof as to the payment of either
principal, interest, taxes or assessments.
Utah Code Annotated, §57-3-2:
1) Every conveyance, or instrument in writing
affected real estate, executed, acknowledged, or
proved, and cerjtified, in the manner prescribed by
this title, and every patent to lands within this
state duly executed and verified according to law,
and every judgment, order, or decree of any court
of record in this state, or a copy of it, required
4

by law to be recorded in the office of the county
recorder, and every financing statement which
complies with S70A-9-402 shall, from the time of
filing the same with the recorder for mortgagees,
and lien holders are deemed to purchase and take
with notice.
2) The recording of an instrument as provided
in Subsection (|l) is not affected to any change in
an interest rate in accordance with terms of an
agreement pertajining to the obligation for which
the instrument Irecorded was given as security.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE.

This is an appe(al from
Divorce

entered

Petition

to

lafter

Modify

an

Order

trial

Decree

on

of

Modifying

Decree of

plaintiff-respondent's

Divorce

and

defendant-

appellant's Counter-petition

to Modify Decree of Divorce in

the Fourth Judicial District

Court, Judge

presiding.

George E. Ballif

The Coi^rt modified the Decree of Divorce which

had been previously entered on the 24th day of October, 1980
regarding

health

insurance, visitation,

plaintiff's liability
home,

and

alimony.

to pay
In

addition,

pay to

attorneys

fees.

is

regarding

plaintif f|-respondent's

mortgage

payment

on

the

support,

on the parties1

the mortgage

defendant-appellant to
It

child

the

court

ordered

plaintiff-respondent $450 in

from

the

decision of the court

obligation

parties' home

appellant appeals.

5

to

that

make

the

defendant-

B.

COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS.

The original complaint for
filed

by

complaint

divorce in

plaintif f|-respondent
for

divoirce

on

specified

plaintiff-respondent, was

to

July
in

this matter was
17,

1980.

paragraph

The

11

that

assume and be responsible for

the mortgage due and owing on the home of the

parties.

(R.

2)
On

the

same

respondent also
signed

by

day

filled

of filing the complaint, plaintiffan

Appearance,

Consent

and Waiver

defendant-appellant in which defendant-appellant

acknowledged that

he understood

the complaint

agreed to the contents thereof.
Subsequently,
its Findings of

(R. 5)

ion October

Faqt,

and that he

24, 1980, the court entered

Conclusions

of

Divorce between the parties. (R. 11-17)

Law

and

Decree of

Both documents were

drafted by plaintiff-respondent's attorney.

Both documents

also contained a pro.Vision requiring plaintiff-respondent to
assume and be responsible for the mortgage due

and owing on

the home of the parties. (R. 16)
Defendant-appellant filed

a Petition

to Modify Decree

of Divorce on or abo,ut August 21, 1986, in which
that plaintiff-respojndent
due and

owing

to

had not

Jiis parents

he alleged

been satisfying the debt
for

the

purchase

of the

parties1 home and requested the court to order her to do the
same. (R. 19-21)

([Defendant-appellant
6

also

requested the

court to

specificaljly define

his visitation rights, reduce

child support, and tb allow him to list ^11 of
as beneficiaries

on his

his children

life insurance policy.

Defendant-

appellant does not s(eek appeal on those issues.)
Plaintif f-respo|ndent filed a counter-petition to modify
decree

of

divorce

health insurance
Divorce,

regarding

and

visitation,

alleging

defendant-lappellant

that

had

support,

the

Decree of

s^nce

quit

title and interest he had in the home

child

claimed all right,

aijid real

property to

the plaintiff-respondent, and therefore plaintiff-respondent
was entitled to have
nullified.
C.

of the

Decree of Divorce

(R. 24-218)

DISPOSITION OF COURT BELOW.

Pursuant

to

submitted their
the

paragraph 6

Court

order

of

the

court (R. 95) the parties

proposed Proffers

arguing

and Findings

of Fact to

their respective po$itions. (R. 97-155)

Subsequently, on the

15th

Maetani,

Relations

Domestic

day

of

Jun^,

1987, Howard H.

Commissioner,

entered

his

Recommendation in wh|ich he adopted paragraph 9 of plaintiffrespondent's

proposed

Findings

of

Fapt, which stated as

follows:
The court makes no order as it relates to the
moneys owing to defendant's parents.
If any
moneys are in fact due and owing, the defendant's
parents have tjhe obligation of enforcing any such
right against persons who a court of competent
jurisdiction majy determine to be responsible. (R.
156-157)
7

An objection
Recommendation was
appellant

t,o the

filed June 26, 1987, in which defendant-

objectedi

Commissioner

Domestic Relations Commissioner's

to

regarding,

the
the

recommendation

debt

due

and

owing

of

the

to his

parents, the Commissioner's failure to reduce child support,
and the

Commissioner's ruling regarding life insurance. (R.

158-159)
A hearing
before the

on djefendant-appellant's

Honorable Judge

George E.

Judicial District Co,lirt on the 16th
The Honorable

Judge Ballif

objection was held
Ballif of the Fourth

day of

December, 1987.

subsequently entered his ruling

on the 17th day of Djecember, 1987 as follows:
1. That the agreement of October, 1974, was not a
mortgage in that it does not describe land to
which it would apply, nor does it contain any
provisions relative to rights, obligations and
procedures for foreclosing the same and was not
recorded.
2.
That the Decree of Divorce's mention of
"mortgage" without any other reference to the
specific obligation claimed to be a mortgage in
favor of a thir(d party, and not of record, would
be
insufficient
to
establish
liability to
plaintiff to pay and discharge that debt.
(R.
199-202)
Defendant-appellant filed

his Notice

of Appeal on the

13th day of January, 1988. (R. 186-187)
D.

STATEMENT QF FACTS.

Prior to defend'ant-appellant's
respondent,

defendant-appellant

marriage

purchased
8

to plaintiffa home and real

property located at 415 East 900 North, Ijehi, Utah. (R. 130)
In order

to purchase

the home, defendant-appellant assumed

an existing V.A. mortgage
remaining

$31,484.0|4

of

from

$6,818.59, and

his

father.

borrowed the

Said purchase was

consummated in October, 1974. (R. 145-14^)
Plaintiff-respondent
married

several

During

the

months

course

acquire money

and

defendant-appellant

later

of

the

orders for

on

July

marriage,

payment of

25,

both

were

1975. (R. 1)
parties would

the obligation to the

Veterans Administrateon and to defendant-appellantfs parents
for satisfaction of the obligations on the home. (R. 239) A
Release of Mortgage was
Veterans

delivered

Administration

on

or

to

the

about

parties

the

21st

by the
day

of

September, 1979 (R. 148 and 224).
The Decree of D,ivorce
signed

by

Judge

George

in
E.

home and real property
900

North,

Lehi,

of October,

was awarded

of the

Utah.

divorce

upon the

papers

home of

were

was originally

1980.

at 415 East

Plaintiff-respondent
for the

the parties".

drafted

by

In that

possession of the

parties located

ordered to "assume afnd be responsible
and owing

matter

Ballif of the Fourth Judicial

District Court on the 24th day
decree, plaintiff-respondent

this

was

also

mortgage due

(R. 15-17)

The

plaintiff-respondent's

attorney, and the diyorce was granted pursuant to defendantappellant's

default!—defendant-appellant
9

havina

sianed an

Appearance, Consent and Waiver.
At

the

obligation

time

due

,of the

and| owing

(R. 5)

decree
on

of

the

divorce,

parties

the

home

only

was

an

unrecorded handwritten

note between defendant-appellant and

his father, Fon Rothe,

on October

18, 1974, that required

defendant-appellant to pay his father as follows:
Dale Rothe agrjees to pay $150.00 a month on the
house loan of $38,302.63
minus the Veterans
Administration
loan
of
$6,818.59
plus the
interest I will have to pay to Bank of America—
signed Fon K. I^othe and Dale K. Rothe.
Defendant-appel|lant?s parents
the parties to use
located at

to purchase

415 East

divorce, both

had loaned

the home

and real property

900 North, Lehi, Utah.

plain(tiff-respondent

the money to

Prior to their

and defendant-appellant

were faithful in pay|ing to defendant-appellant's parents the
$150.00 a month due
extended

to

and owing

on the

defendant-appellant

plaintiff-respondent for

loan which

prior

purchase

of

had been

to his marriage to

the

residence.

In

addition, after the ,entry of the decree of divorce, and with
the
paid

consent
the

of

plaintiff-respondent,

house

payment

for

plaintiff-respondent out of the
owed

her

each

morxey,

a

period

defendant-appellant
of

$220.00 in

38 months for

alimony that he

and would send plaintiff-respondent

the remaining $70.00|. (R. 226)
On August 27,
his

interest

in

1981, defendant-appellant
the

quit claimed

home and real property to plaintiff10

respondent at the urging
that her

and the

plaintiff-respondent

children had

plaintiff-respondent
appellant's

of

nothing. (R. 225) However,

continued

parents

the

who said

to

$150.00

|pay

to defendant-

a month obligation until

plaintiff-respondent remarried in Octobelr of 1982, at which
time she

made at

least an

additional payment

on the debt

owing to defendant-appellant's parents ajnd then discontinued
payment all together.
At

the

hearing

before

Ballif on December 16,
that at

the time

obligation

owing

mortgage and
a note

1987, plaintiff-irespondent testified

of the
to

the Honorlable Judge George E.

decree of divorce she thought the

defendant-appellant's

parents

was a

acknowledged that she understood that they had

on the

home,. (R.

246)

Howevelr, on

advice of her

attorney, she discontinued payment of thie obligation because
she had been counseled since it was
mortgage,

she

was

not

not

in

fact

a legal

obligated to satisfy the same. (R.

242)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Although
appellant

and

the
his

handwritten
father,

requirements of Utah Code
does not

note

between

defendant-

Fon Rothe, did not fulfill the

Annotated 57-1-14

in that:

"it

describe land to which it would apply, nor does it

contain any provisions relative
and procedures

to the

rights, obligations

for foreclosing the same", (R. 183, 184) nor
11

did it fill the requirements of
in that

it was

found that a

not recorded,

mortgage

handwritten note

the

the trial

Code Annotated

court should have

existed.

It

is

clear the

between defendant-appellant and his father

do not constitute
however,

still

57-1-6 Utah

a

court

legal

mortgage

should

have

pursuant

properly

to statute;

found

that an

equitable mortgage existed.
55 Am.Jur.2d,

Mortgages,

§12, P.

201-202

states as

follows:
Under the maximi, equity regards that as done which
ought to be done, an agreement to secure an
obligation by a mortgage is generally regarded as
operating as anj equitable mortgage.
This is true
where real estate is acquired with money loaned
for the purchase, under a promise that the lender
is to receive a mortgage....
The evidence is uncontroverted that in October of 1974,
defendant-appellant, prior
respondent, purchased

to

a home

his

and real

415 East 900 North, Lehi, Utah.
purchase the
V.A.

of

from

father entered

$6,818.59,

his
into

father.
a

to plaintiff-

property located at

(R. 223 & 224)

home, defendant-appellant

mortgage

$31,484.04

marriage

and

In order to

assumed an existing

borrowed

the remaining

Defendant-appellant and his

handwritten

note

which

states as

follows:
Dale Rothe agrees to pay $150.00 a month on the
house loan of $38,302.63
minus the Veterans
Administration
loan
of
$6,818.59
plus the
interest I will have to pay to Bank of America—
signed Fon K. Rothe and Dale K. Rothe. (R. 145 &
12

253)
It is

clear

firom the

handwritten note

record

parties

payment

of

even

though the

between defendant-appellant and his father

do not constitute a legal mortgage
the

that

did

ihtend

the

the

purchase

in the

home

money

statutory sense,

to be security for the
loaded

by

defendant-

appellant's father to defendant-appellant by use of the term
"house

loan"

(R.

14 5)

and

by

virtue

of defendant-

appellant's testimony (R. 223).
The

trial

court

also

erred in ruling that there was

insufficient evidence to hold plaintiff-despondent liable on
the

debt

owing

to defendant-appellant<s parents when both

parties acknowledged the debt,
partially

performed

respondent
$150.00 a

paying

authorized

and plaintiff-respondent had

thereon.

In fact, plaintiff-

defendant-appellant

to

make

the

month payment to defendant-appellant's parents by

withholding the

same

(R. 225

Indeed, plaintif f-respoifident indicated that

& 241)

the reason she was

from

plaintiff-respondent's alimony.

paying defendant-appellant's

parents is

because there was a note on the home whi<?h she thought was a
mortgage. (R. 246)
Indeed, because plaintiff-respondent
aware

of

the

obligation

due

and

admitted

owing

she was

to defendant-

appellant's parents, and she further thought said obligation
was a

mortgage, the

court's finding th£t plaintiff thought
13

there was

no

Veterans
weight

other

obligation

Administration
of

mortgage

evidence,.

several occasions

on

the

was

home

clearly against the

Plaintiff-respondent

she was

aware of

and

the

other

to

admitted

on

two obligations on the

home during the course of the marriage: one
Administration

besides the

to the Veterans

defendant-appellant's

parents. (R. 245, 24!6)
Since both parties clearly
obligation

owing

to

fact a mortgage, the
the term

indicated they

defendant-appellant's
trial court

"mortgage" was

thought the

parents was in

erred in

failing to find

a diction error of both plaintiff-

respondent and her attorney pursuant to a no-contest divorce
in which

defendant-appellant was

It was plaintiff-respondent and
the language

and incorporated

unrepresented by counsel.

her

attorney

the same

who selected

into the decree of

divorce and findings of fact and conclusions of law.
ludicrous to
herself of

assume plaintiff-respondent may simply relieve

a financial

assume pursuant

the term

responsibility which

defendant-appellant's

legal statutory

mortgage.

"mortgage",, plaintiff-respondent

knowledge of

parents

did not

In fact, selecting
was charged with

what l^Lens were of record against the property

pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, §57-1-6.
by

she agreed to

to the decree of divorce simply because the

obligation owing to
constitute a

It is

plaintiff-respondent

and

An investigation

her attorney would have shown
14

there were no recorded mortgages against the property at the
time

of

the

decre,e

of

divorce.

Consequently, the only

obligation owing on the

property

woulc| be

defendant-appellantf,s

parents,

which,

unrecorded, plaintiff-respondent admitted
knowledge of the same.
As a

that

owing to

although
she

was

had specific

(R. 246)

result, the

trial court

erred in

not finding a

mutual mistake as to both parties1 belief the

debt owing to

defendant-appellantf!s parents
reforming the decree

of

was

divorce

a

to

mortgage
reflect

and

thus

the parties'

intent that plaintiflf-respondent be responsible for the debt
regardless of the use of the term "mortgage" to describe the
debt.

It is

understood

clear from

the

legal

the record

requirements

"mortgage" pursuant

to Utah

defendant-appellant

testifies

somebody

money,

indicates
obligation

she

and

does

is, and

R.
not
R.

^either party clearly
flor

statute.

245

of a

(See R. 230 in which

mortgage

means

you

owe

wherein plaintiff-respondent

understand
246

creation

what

an

unsecured

in which plaintiff-respondent

defines mortgage asfahatwas owing on the home.)
Nevertheless, there is no
agreed to

satisfy the

obligation on

error on the part of the
respondent

of

her

responsibility simply

dispute plaintiff-respondent

trial court

the home.

%o relieve plaintiff-

court-ordered

because the
15

It was an

and

stipulated

obligation to defendant-

appellant's

parents

does

not constitute a legal mortgage.

The trial court should have reformed
to reflect

the decree

of divorce

the understanding of the parties that plaintiff-

respondent would be responsible
defendant-appellant's

to

satisfy

parents, which

the

loan from

was acquired for the

purchase of the home..
ARGUMENT
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE DEBT TO
DEFENDANT-APPEllLANT'S PARENTS DID NOT CONSTITUTE A
LEGAL OR EQUITABLE MORTGAGE,
Section

57-1-1,4, Utah

Code

Annotated,

(1953),

as

amended, sets for th,e statutory form for creation of a legal
mortgage as follows:
(here
insert
name) , mortgagor,
of
(insert place of residence), hereby
mortgages to
(insert name), mortgagee,
of
(insejrt place of residence), for the sum
of ~
dollars, the following described tract
of land in
County, Utah, to wit:
(here describe the premises).
This mortgage is given to secure the following
indebtedness (here
state amount and form of
indebtedness, maturity, rate of interest, by and
to whom payable and where).
The mortgagor
agrees to
pay all taxes and
assessments on said premises, and the sum of
dollarfe
attorneys1
fees in case of
foreclosure.
Witness the hand of
of
, 19 .

said mortgagor

this

day

Such mortgage as executed by law shall have the
effect of a conveyance of the
land therein
described,
together
with
all
the
rights,
privileges and appurtenances thereunto belonging,
16

to the mortgagee, his heirs, assigns and legal
representatives!, as security for the payment of
the indebtedness thereon set forth/ with covenants
from the mortgagor of general warranty of title,
and that all taxes and assessments levied and
assessed upon the land described, during the
continuance of jthe mortgage, will be paid previous
to the day appointed for the sale of such lands
for taxes; and! may be foreclosure as provided by
law upon any default being made in any of the
conditions thereof as to the pdyment of either
principal, interest, taxes or assessments.
The handwritten

agreement

between

defendant-appellant and

his father dated October 18, 1974 reads as follows:
Dale Rothe agrees to pay $150.00 a month on the
house loan of $38,302.63
minu^ the Veterans
Administration
loan
of
$6,818.59
plus the
interest I will have to pay to Bar^k of America—
signed Fon K. Rothe and Dale K. Rothe. (R. 183,
145)
The Court, having reviewed

the note

and the statutory

requirements for a mortgage, concluded as follows:
The court concludes that the agreement dated
October of 1974i is not a mortgage since it does
not describe land to which it would apply, nor
does it contain any provisions relative to rights,
obligations and procedures for foreclosing the
same, and was not recorded. (R. 1^3 & 184)
Although it

is

true

between defendant-appellant

that

the

and his

the legal requirements of Utah Code
trial

court

existed.
between
equitable

erred

in

father did not fulfill
Annotated §57-1-14, the

its decision that no valid mortgage

The court should
defendant-appellant
mortgage

handwritten agreement

against

have

found

that

the agreement

and

his father constituted an

the

home

17

and

real

property

located at 415 East 900 North, Lehi, Utah.
55

Am.Jur.

2d,

Mortgages,

§12, P. 201-202 states as

follows:
Under the maxim1, equity regards that as done which
ought to be done, an agreement to secure an
obligation by a mortgage is generally regarded as
operating as an equitable mortgage. This is true
where real estate is acquired with money loaned
for the purchase, under a promise that the lender
is to receive a mortgage....
Indeed, an equitable lien is created
"which is

enforceable against

upon the property

the property in the hands of

not only the original contractor, but of his...purchasers or
encumbrancers with notice." 4 Pomeroy, Eguitv Jurisprudence,
§12 35.

Thus

an

agreement

that

particular

property "is

security for a debt also gives rise to an equitable mortgage
even though it does not constitute a legal
Bay

v.

Minderhout.

38

Cal.Rptr 505, 392 P.2d 265 (1964),

Benton v. Benton, 528 P.2d 1244
185

Kansas

389,

345

P.2d

v.

Loveland,

678

Taggart, 628 P.2d 1283

P.2d

(Kan. 1974),

1015)

mortgage has been recognized in
Bown

mortgage. (Coast

The theory of equitable

the
292

Hill v. Hill.

State

of

(Utah,

(1981), Hansen

Utah.

See

1984), Baker v.

v. Kohler,

550 P.2d

186 (1976).
Defendant-appellant

purchased

the

home

property located at 415 East 900 North, Lehi,
his marriage
the home,

and

real

Utah prior to

to plaintiff-respondent.

In order to purchase

defendant-appellant assumed

an existing Veterans

18

Administration
borrowed

the

Rothe.

mortgage

with

remaining

a

$31,484.04

his

father, Fon

(See copies of cancelled checks R. 146)

Pursuant to

defendant-appellant'is promise to
money

balance of $6,818.59, and

that

was

loaned

to

from

pay

him

his

to

father

purchase

back the

the home,

defendant-respondent and his father executed the handwritten
note cited above.
It is

clear from the note that defendant-appellant and

his father intended to create an obligation against the home
by executing

said note.

The

money was loan to defendant-

appellant as purchase money for the
located

at

415

East

900

home and

real property

North, Lehi, Utah.

Indeed, the

language of the note itself indicates that Dale Rothe agrees
to pay

"$150 a month on the house loan of $38,302.63". The

selection of the

word

"house

loan"

clearly

indicates an

intention on the parlt of defendant-appellant and his father,
Fon Rothe, to create a mortgage.
note, it

is clear

After

from the record of defendant-appellant's

testimony that he intended, or at
note constituted
of his father.
security

having executed the

least believed,

that the

a Valid mortgage on his property on behalf
(R.

interest

223

&

230)

is unnecessary

Specific

mention

if it otherwise appears

that the parties intended to create such an interest.
Bay v.

Minderhout, 38

Cal.Rptr. 505,

The evidence is uncohtroverted

of a

Coast

392 P.2d 265 (1964).

that defendant-appellant and
19

his father,

Fon Rothe

intended to create a mortgage on the

subject property.
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE
WAS INSUFFICIENT
EVIDENCE TO HOLD PLAINTIFFRESPONDENT LIABLE ON THE DEBT OWING TO DEFENDANTAPPELLANT'S PARENTS WHEN BOTH PARTIES ACKNOWLEDGED
THE DEBT, AND PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT HAD PARTIALLY
PERFORMED PAYING THEREON.
The

decree

of

divorce

specifically

plaintiff-respondent is to "assume

and

be

states

that

responsible for

the mortgage due and owing upon the home of the parties...."
(R. 16) At the time of the entry
there was

only one

obligation due

which was awarded

to

handwritten

between

note

of the

decree of divorce,

and owing

plaintiff-respondent,
Dale

Rothe

on the home,
to

wit:

the

and his father, Fon

Rothe•
In

order

to

purchase

the

home, defendant-appellant

assumed an existing ^.A. mortgage of $6,818.59, and borrowed
the remaining

$31,484.04 from

his father.

The $6,818.59,

which was left owing to the Veterans Administration was paid
off and a release of mortgage was executed
1979. (R. 148)

Wherefore, at the time of the divorce decree

in October of 1980, there was
on

the

home,

on September 21,

and

that

only one

was

the

obligation existing

obligation

existing to

defendant-appellant's parents.
After
respondentfs

the

decree

of

permission,

divorce,

and

with

defendant-appellant
20

plaintiff-

withheld the

monthly

payment

of

$150•00

from

plaintiff-respondent's

alimony and paid the same directly to defendant-respondent's
parents in order to fulfill
(R. 225,

240 & 241)

the

obligation

in

this

matter.

plaintiff-respondent acknowledged
note on the home held by
too believed

said note

arguments

respondent was aware of
parents,

had

In

addition,

that she knew there was a

defendant-respdndent's parents and

These facts, together with
appellant's

said home.

Approximately 38 payments were made by

plaintiff-respondent

that she

on

was a

those

below,
the

voluntarily

set

mortgage. (R. 246)

^orth

clearly

debt

in defendant-

show

plaintiff-

to defendant-appellant's

assumed

to pay the same and had

partially performed thereon.
III. THE TRIAIi COURT'S FINDING THAT PLAINTIFFRESPONDENT THOUGHT THERE WAS NO OTHER OBLIGATION
ON THE HOME BESIDES THE VETERANS ADMINISTRATION
MORTGAGE WAS AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE.
In equity

cases, the

appellate coi^rt can review facts

as well as law and may reverse the lower court's

finding if

the evidence clearly preponderates against the trial court's
decision.

McBride v.

McBridef 581

P.2d 996

(Utah, 1978);

Peterson v. Carter, 579 P.2d 329 (Utah, ^.978); Provo City v.
Lambert, 574 P. 2d 72|7
P.2d 1100

(Utah, 19,77) ; Richards v.

P.2d 948 (Utah, 1977).
one

in

(Utah, 1978);

equity,

this

Consequently,
court

Hatch v.

Bastian, 567

Pine Ranch, Inc., 559
since this

court is

is not bound to recognize the
21

trial court's findings if contrary to evidence.
The findings

of the

Honorable Judge

George E. Ballif

state in paragraph 1|5 as follows:
There is no evidence to support any knowledge on
the part of the plaintiff of an obligation against
the home other than the V.A. mortgage which she
assumed was still in force, although actually
released some months prior to the filing of the
complaint for dlivorce. (R. 194 & 184)
The

Honorable

Judge

Balliffs

finding

is

in direct

contradiction to the testimony given by plaintiff-respondent
on direct examination by her attorney:
Question: Will you tell the court as best as you
can what you understood the reason why
you Were paying Dale's
parents the
payments on the home?
Answer:

Well, I thought it was because they had
a note on the home. Well, I knew there
was 'a note, but I thought it was a
mortgage.

Question: So you thought the
was,
in
fact,
property?
Answer:

loan to the parents
a mortgage on the

Right.

Question: And so you know the money was paid, over
the course of the marriage, there was
money! paid to Dale's parents and to the
V.A.?
Answer:
Paragraph

Right.
10

of

(R. 246)
the

Court's

Findings

of

Fact and

Conclusions of Law states as follows:
The court finds that the home was purchased by the
parties in 1974, and that there had been a
recorded mortgage
in favor
of the Veterans
22

Administration against the home dt that time and
the parties both testified they were aware of the
payments being made on the mortgage out of their
joint funds. In September of 1979, the Veterans
Administration mortgage was released without the
knowledge of plaintiff, the decree of divorce was
entered on October 24, 1980. ((emphasis added)
(R. 192)
However,

despite

plaintiff-respondent

the

finding

testified

on

qf

the

dirtect

court,

examination

defendant-respondent!1 s attorney as follows:
Question: And when you first marrfied Mr. Rothe,
was their an obligation on the home in
Lehi?
Answer:

Yes.

Q u e s t i o n : To th,e V e t e r a n s , a V.A.
Answer:

rtortgage?

Yes.

Question: And what lending institution was holding
that tnortgage? Do you recall?
Answer:

What is that?

Question: What bank did you pay?
Answer:

I don't know.

Question: How did you make
regular basis?
Answer:

the

payment

on a

With a money order.

Question: Whose responsibility w^s that in the
household in the scheme qf things?
Answer:

It just depended. Sometimes I would pay
it and sometimes he woula pay it.

Question: How much was it a month, do you recall?
Answer:

I doni't know; I c a n ' t reitiember.
23

Question: Do you recall when it was satisfied?
Answer:

I can't remember.

Question: Do you have any quarrel with the release
of mortgage in the court file which
indicates that it was
satisfied in
September of 1979?
Answer:

If that's
what it says.
I
remember when it was paid off.
239)

From the

record, it is clear that plaintiff-respondent

"simply did not remember"
mortgage was paid off.

when the

Veterans Administration

There is no indication whatsoever in

the record that the release of the mortgage
Administration

in

don't
(R.

September

of

1979

by the Veterans

was

without

the

knowledge of plaintiiff-respondent.
Section 57-3-2 Utah Code

Annotated (1985)

as amended,

states as follows:
Every
conveyance,
or
instrument in writing
affecting real estate, executed, acknowledged or
proved, and certified, in the manner prescribed by
this title, and| every patent to lands within this
state duly executed and verified according to law,
and every judgment, order, or decree of any court
of record in this state, or a copy of it, required
by law to be recorded in the office of the county
recorder, and i every financing statement which
complies with §;70a-9-402 shall, from the time of
filing the sam!e with the recorder for record, in
part notice toj all persons of their contents.
Subsequent
purchasers,
mortgagees,
and lien
holders are deemed to purchase and take with
notice, (emphasis added)
Consequently,

swhen

plaintiff-respondent

deal with the real property, to

wit: the

24

undertook to

parties

home in

Lehi, she

was charged

with the knowledge of what was shown

by the records of the county recorder in Utah County•
Crompton v,

Jenson, 78 Utah 55, 1 P.2d 242 (1931).

plaintiff-respondent

took

notice11 of

been filed

what had

County Recorder's

office.

plaintiff-respondent

on

land

with

researching

have

seen

said records,

that the release of

21,

1979.

property

defendant-appellant's

parents,

which,

plaintiff-respondent

admitted

specific knowledge of the same.

had been duly

Consequently, the only

obligation owing on the

unrecorded,

"constructive

Administration loan

September

Indeed,

on the records of the Utah

By

would

mortgage on the Veterans
executed

the

See

would

be

that

owing to

although
that

was

she had

(R. 246)

IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT
THE TERM "MORTGAGE" WAS A DICTION ERROR OF BOTH
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT AND HER ATTORNEY PURSUANT TO
A "NO CONTEST" DIVORCE IN WHICH DEFENDANT WAS
UNREPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
The original

complaint for

filed by Plaintiff-Respondent on
The

complaint

for

divorce

divorqe in this matter was
July

2)

due and

(R. 1)

and

be

responsible for

owing in the home of the parties

On the

same

day

Respondent

also

filled

of

filing

an

signed by Defendant-Appellant
acknowledged that

1980.

specified in paragraph 11 that

Plaintiff-Respondent was to assume
the mortgage

17,

the

complaint Plaintiff-

Appearance,
in

he understood
25

(R.

Consent and Waiver

which Defendant-Appellant
the complaint

and that he

agreed to the contents thereof. (R. 5)
Subsequently, on October 24, 1980, the
Findings of
between

Fact, Conclusions

the

documents

parties.

were

of Law and Decree of Divorce

(Records

drafted

Plaintiff

is

to

11

through

17.)

of Divorce

assume

mortgage due and owing on the

and

reads as follows:

be responsible for the

home of

the parties

obligation due and owing upon the automobile..."
Prior

to

their

Both

by Plaintiff-Respondent's attorney

and Paragraph 9 of the Decree
"The

Court enter its

divorce,

and the

(R. 16)

Plaintiff-Respondent

Defendant-Appellant were faithful

in

paying

and

to Defendant-

Appellant's parents

the $150.00

the home

which had

been extended

home and

real property located at 415 East 900 North, Lehi,

Utah.

per month due and owing on
for the

purchase of the

(R. 224 & 246)

Section
Amended)

30-3-5(3)

allows

the

Utah

Code

trial

court

jurisdiction to "make subsequent
the support

maintenance of

Annotated
to

(1953, As

have

changes or

continuing

new orders for

the parties, the custody of the

children and their support, maintenance, health,
care, or
and

the distribution

necessary."

reinstate rights

Land

of the property as is reasonable

However,

"equity

is

not

available to

and privileges voluntarily contracted away

simply because one party
made."

and dental

v.

has

Land,

come
605
26

to

P.2d

regret
1248

the bargain

(Utah,

1980).

Consequently, if the parties
drafting

divorce

select

documents,

the

an

ambiguous

Court

must construe the

ambiguity to determine what was contemplated
at the

term in

time said documents were drafted.

by the parties

Land v. Land, 605

P.2d 1248, 1251 (Utah, 1980).
In the case of Rollo
1983)

the

Utah

v.

Supreme

Rollo,

Court

P.2d

reversed

decision in interpretation of a decree
the former

661

962 (Utah,

lower courtfs

a

of divorce

in which

wife sued for specific performance of the decree

which obligated the former husband to pay one-half of a loan
from his

grandmother secured

by the parties on
that

case

stated

their house.
as

Utah

Code

declaration

order said
Annotated
of

The

decree of

divorce in

follows: "To thq plaintiff... 2. The

homestead located at 3 36
refused to

by a second mortgage executed

West

Sunbow."

The

reimbursement and
§78-2 3-4

homestead

in doing so cited

regarding

rights.

trial court

In

the

statutory

reversing

said

decision, the Utah Supreme Court stated as follows:
In refusing to order such reimbursement, the
trial court attached unwarranted meaning to the
word 'homestead1 in the description of what was
awarded in the decree. The court said 'homestead'
meant only the equitable, statutory right to
secure the 'homestead1 amounts stated in the
statute incident to a sale on execution to satisfy
creditors.
The record is devoid of any fact or
document or statement that would support such a
interpretation.
The language of the award says
nothing about a statutory 'homestead' right..."
(Rollo, supra., at 963).
Both parties clearly indicated
27

that

they

thought the

obligation

owing

tt> Defendant-Appellant's

fact a mortgage.
the

Decree

of

(R. 224
Divorce

246)

parents was in

Indeed, after the

entry of

and with the consent of Plaintiff-

Respondent, Defendant-Appellant paid the house payment for a
period

of

38

months

for

$220.00 in alimony that
send

he owed

Plaintiff-Respondent

This arrangement continued
had

delivered

to

Plaintiff-Respondent out of the

the

her each

month, and would

remaining

until

$70.00.

(R.226)

after Defendant-Appellant

Plaintiff-Respondent

a

quit claim deed

giving his interest in the property to her.

After receiving

Defendant-Appellant's

interest

Respondent attempted to take
property.

At that

that there

was no

in the property, Plaintiff-

a second

mortgage out

on the

time, Plaintiff-Respondent became aware
recorded mortgage

against the property.

Consequently, Plaintiff-Respondent took the position that if
there was no recorded mortgage on the property,
going to

pay the

obligation as

agreed to

she was not

pursuant to the

Decree of Divorce (R. 246 & 247).
It is ludicrous to assume that Plaintiff-Respondent may
simply relieve herself of the financial responsibility which
she agreed to

assume

pursuant

to

the

Decree

of Divorce

simply because the obligation owing to Defendant-Appellant's
parents

did

not

constitute

a

legal

statutory mortgage.

Indeed, Plaintiff-Respondent acknowledged that she knew that
there was a note

against the

home, which
28

she believed was

the mortgage

at the

time of

the Decree

of Divorce as set

forth to her following testimony:
Well, I thought it was because they had a
note on the home. Well, I knew there was a note,
but I thought it was a mortgage. (Record 246.)
Indeed, by
actions, the

sanctioning Plaintiff-Respondent's wrongful

Court has allowed her to perpetrate a manifest

injustice upon

Defendant-Appellant.

upon Plaintiff-Respondent

paying off

parents, Defendant-Appellant
the

property

to

Plaintiff-Respondent.

so,

Plaintiff-Respondent

that

she

is

parents

the

going

monthly

Respondent has

to

in reliance

the obligation to his

quit-claimed

done

not

Indeed,

his

interest in

Then, after having

informs Defendant-Appellant
pay to Defendant-Respondent's

mortgage

obligation.

Plaintiff-

left Defendant-Appellant in a position where

he must satisfy the same to his parents, event though

he no

longer has an interest in the home.
V,
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING A MUTUAL
MISTAKE AS TO BOTH PARTIES' BELIEF AS TO THE DEBT
OWING TO
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT'S PARENTS WAS A
MORTGAGE AND THUS REFORMING THE DECREE OF DIVORCE
TO REFLECT THE PARTIES1 INTENT THAT PLAINTIFFRESPONDENT BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DEBT REGARDLESS
OF THE TERM "MORTGAGE" TO DESCRIBE THE DEBT,
In the

case of

Kier v.

Condrack, 478 P.2d 327 (Utah,

1970), the Utah Supreme Court states as follows:
We recognize that the validity of the rule relied
upon by the defendants that to be enforceable a
contract must be sufficiently definite in its
terms that the parties know what is required of
them. But like all rules, which are necessarily
29

stated in generality, it is only applicable in the
proper circumstances, where the justice of the
case requires: as a shield to protect a party from
an injustice, and not as a weapon with which to
perpetrate an injustice.
The record is clear that plaintiff-respondent knew that
defendant-appellant's parents had loaned money to defendantappellant to

purchase the home, was aware there was a note,

and thought said note was a mortgage.

(R. 246)

It

is also

undisputed that plaintiff-respondent allowed $150.00 a month
to be withheld
appellant in
months.

from

order to

(R.

226)

relieve herself
between

her

alimony

satisfy the
By

of the

allowing

a

legal

mortgage

his

pursuant

plaintiff-respondent

injustice against

to

which

where there

would
is an

be

because the note

parents

did

not

to Utah statute is

perpetrate

defendant-appellant.

meaningful evidence
court must,

plaintiff-respondent to

obligation simply
and

from defendant-

same for a period of 38

allowing

defendant-appellant

constitute

payment

a

great

Unless there is no

probative,

the trial

ambiguity, take evidence of

pertinent circumstances, including the intent of the parties
at

the

time

of

the

original

clarifying said ambiguity.

divorce

LeBreton v.

for

purposes

of

LeBreton, 604 P.2d

469 (Utah, 1979).
From the

record it is clear that plaintiff-respondent,

at the time of negotiating the
that

the

note

due

and

decree of

owing
30

to

divorce, believed

defendant-respondent's

parents was in fact a mortgage.
that

plaintiff-respondent

"unsecured obligation"
from the

(R. 246)

did

not

was. (R.245)

It is

also clear

understand

There

what

a

is no question

testimony of plaintiff-respondent that at the time

of the decree of divorce, plaintiff-respondent
obligation

owing

to

defendant-appellant's

believed the
parents was in

fact a mortgage. (R.I246)
Defendant-respohdent also believed

the

obligation due

and owing to his parents was in fact a mortgage.
which obligation was due and
property of
the time

of

testified
owing to

the parties

that
his

examination
appellant

the

of

only

father.

by

on the

decree

the

owing

on

home

and real

24th day of October, 1980,

divorce, defendant-respondent

obligation

(R.

the

When asked

223)

pn the home was that

In

addition,

on cross

plajintif f-respondent's attorney, defendant-

indicated

he

did

not

understand

the

legal

significance of Utah statute regarding mortgages pursuant to
the following testimony:
Question: Do you know what "mortgage" means?
Answer:

Well, a "mortgage" to me means the same
thing—I
mean,
somebody owing some
moneyl. I mean, you buy an outfit, a
house}, and you owe the money to them
until! the money is paid up.
You know.
I mean, that's a mortgage. (R.230)

Since neither

party was

aware of

requirements for creation of a "legal
31

the legal statutory

mortgage", they could

not

have

intended

that

plaintiff-respondent

would

assume those obligations on the home which were
mortgages

pursuant

clear that both
owing to

to

Utah

parties

law.

believed

only

valid legal

Indeed, the evidence is
the

obligation

due and

defendant-respondent's parents was in fact a legal

mortgage,

or

property.

at

least

an

equitable

Plaintiff-respondent

mortgage,

on

the

acknowledged there was an

obligation due and owing to defendant-appellant's parents on
the

property,

authorized

alimony for a period
terminated payment
the decree

of

thereon, and

payments

of

38

when she

divorce,

months.

due

and

and

actions

of

the

to

owing

obligation

as

Since there was a
legal

status

that

defendant-

the debt owing

a "mortgage"

and thus

a mortgage in the Decree of

mutual mistake
of

to defendant-

It is clear from the

plaintiff-respondent believed

the

the

3 years after

partially performed

parties

to defendant-appellant's parents was

as

from

after finally conducting a title search on the

appellant and

Divorce.

deducted

Plaintiff-respondent

having

respondent's parents was not recorded.

identified

be

discovered over

after

property that the obligation

testimony

to

by both parties

the obligation to defendant-

respondent's parents at the time of the original decree, the
decree of

divorce should

be reformed to reflect the actual

intent of the parties.

32

CONCLUSION
The handwritten
his

father,

Fon

note

between

Rothe,

did

defendant-appellant and
not

requirements of a mortgage pursuant to
§57-1-14.
note

Nevertheless,

between

equitable

"mortgage"

was

was

sufficient

paid

for

parents

that

in

the

Veterans

debt

father

defendant-appellant

did

and

the course of their marriage at

to

hold

owing

of two

There

plaintiff-respondent

to defendant-appellant's

plaintiff-respondent

admitted on several

obligations on

the home of

during the course of their marriage, one to the

Administration

appellant's

his

defendant-appellant's parents.

occasions she was aware
the parties

Utah Code Annotated,

and

by

evidence

responsible

legal

mortgage on the subject property.

plaintiff-respondent during
$150.00 per month to

the

is clear from the record the

defendant-appellant

constitute an
Said

it

fulfill

parents.

decree of divorce,

and
(R.

the

the

other

245-246)

obligation

due

to

defendant-

At the time of the
and

owing

to the

Veterans Administration had been satisfied, leaving the only
obligation on the

home

the

obligation

due

and

owing to

defendant-appellant's parents.
Since both
obligation owing
fact a

parties clearly
to

mortgage, the

indicated they thought the

defendant-appellant's
trial court

the term "mortgage" was a diction
33

parents

was in

erred in failing to find
error of

both plaintiff-

respondent and her attorney pursuant to a no contest divorce
in which
Since

defendant-appellant was

there

is

no

unrepresented by counsel.

dispute plaintiff-respondent agreed to

satisfy the obligation on the home, it was
part

of

the

court

obligation

to

constitute a legal

on the

to relieve plaintiff-respondent of her

court-ordered and stipulated
the

an error

responsibility

defendant-appellant's
mortgage,

even

simply because
parents does not

though

said obligation

could be considered an equitable mortgage pursuant to common
law.

Consequently, the trial court

mutual mistake

the

not finding a

as to both parties' belief the debt owing to

defendant-appellant's
reforming

erred in

parents

decree

of

was

a

mortgage,

divorce to reflect

and

thus

the parties'

intent that plaintiff-respondent be responsible for the debt
regardless of the use of the term "mortgage" to describe the
debt.
Defendant-respondent respectfully
to reverse

the lower

decree

divorce

of

respondent

to

be

requests

court decision

be

modified

responsible

and to order that the

to

for

this court

require

plaintiff-

the debt to defendant-

appellant's parents.
DATED this ^\

day of September, 1988.

TERRI C. BINGHAM "
U
Attorney for Appellant
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jf day of September, 1988:

Richard B. Johnson
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